Medicare Competitive Acquisition:
Implications for Persons with Diabetes
Sara Rosenbaum
Avi Dor
Brad Finnegan
Emily Jones
The George Washington University
School of Public Health and Health Services
Department of Health Policy
June 16, 2008
Executive Summary
Nearly one in five Medicare beneficiaries has diabetes and these patients face major
challenges in managing their health. The high diabetes rate among beneficiaries also
means that the Medicare program itself is highly vulnerable to the high costs of
uncontrolled diabetes. As a result, great care must be taken when implementing any new
cost containment strategy that has the potential to disrupt access to preventive health care.
This is particularly in the case of the Medicare Competitive Acquisition Program for
Durable Medical Equipment and Supplies (DMEPOS), because of its potential impact on
access to products needed for a basic preventive service, diabetes testing supplies. Yet
despite these concerns over both beneficiary health and program costs, the DMEPOS
program, as it is now being implemented, lacks the types of basic patient safeguards
considered standard in competitive bidding arrangements such as Medicare Advantage
and Medicare Part D.
A key component of the current DMEPOS program where diabetes testing is
concerned is an aggressive effort to expand the use of mail-order purchasing strategies
for diabetes test strips. This expansion appears to have been made without any analysis of
the quality of mail-order services, beneficiaries’ early experiences with mail-order, or the
effects of mail-order purchases on overall Medicare costs. The CMS decision to proceed
with mail order was instead based on an aggregate estimate (no evidence was cited) of
mail-order use, without further analysis of the quality of mail-order services, beneficiary
experiences with mail-order, or the effects of mail-order purchases on overall Medicare
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costs. Indeed, as recently as March 2008, CMS touted unit cost savings achieved through
competitive acquisition, without offering any accompanying estimate of the overall cost
of treatment for patients with diabetes in the competitive bidding regions, and without
any analysis of the impact of competitive acquisition on patient care and health outcome.
There simply is no evidence regarding the effects of mail-order on overall diabetesrelated Medicare costs in the competitive bidding regions, and no analysis of the effects
of the aggressive use of mail order on health care access or quality or health outcomes.
The competitive acquisition program, as described in both the statute and
regulations, is virtually devoid of beneficiary protections generally, and details
concerning the use of mail order for diabetes testing supplies in particular. CMS
standards appear simply to assume that beneficiaries who can make the system work will
try to do so and that no harm can result, since unhappy users always can return to retail
outlets. But the net effect of this haphazard approach to the question of how elderly and
disabled patients acquire and use an essential preventive service invites patient safety
problems if beneficiaries, unable to navigate mail order, test themselves less frequently.
Moreover – and paradoxically – mail order could actually expose Medicare to potentially
heightened costs, as consumers who experience problems with mail-order suppliers
return to retail purchasing, even as stockpiles of inappropriate, high-volume, mail-order
supplies continue to mount in these patients’ homes.
This analysis leads us to two basic recommendations:


An immediate focus should be on the development of patient protections
specifically applicable to the mail-order diabetes supplies market. To an extent far
greater than recognized under the statute and regulations, Part B durable medical
equipment, prosthetic and orthopedic items, and medical supplies all touch
beneficiaries in very real ways. The items and services covered by DMEPOS – in
particular, diabetes supplies – are purchased not by health care professionals but
by the beneficiaries themselves. Over one quarter of all Medicare beneficiaries
experience some level of cognitive dysfunction, and millions lack the ability,
knowledge and experience to navigate a competitive system on their own without
additional assistance or education. Essential protections are needed in the areas of
marketing, enrollment and disenrollment, benefit design, quality standards, and
patient protections.



Second, comprehensive evaluation is essential; it would be ironic indeed if mail
order actually increased overall Medicare costs, but this is not an outcome that
can be discounted. This is particularly true in view of the fact that to date, CMS’
focus has been on unit price discounts rather than overall cost-savings. For this
reason, CMS should halt any expansion of competitive acquisition of diabetes
supplies in the absence of further research. In view of the current, inadequate
level of understanding of the effects of competitive bidding, we believe that
before any further expansion of competitive acquisition, careful evaluation of
Medicare patient behavior is essential, particularly the behavior of vulnerable
beneficiaries in navigating competitive systems.
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Introduction
The ultimate test of health insurance is its ability to assure access to high quality
health care, particularly treatments and services essential to the management of serious,
long-term, and deadly conditions that nonetheless are amenable to early and continuous
management.1 For this reason, it is essential to understand the access, quality, and patient
safety implications of cost containment approaches, even those that might superficially
appear to present minimal risk.
No patient population presents a stronger case for cautiously introducing – and
carefully measuring the patient impact of – cost containment strategies than persons with
diabetes. This is particularly the case for Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes. This is
true because of their heightened vulnerability to the ravages of the disease, as well as to
cost containment strategies that lack basic patient safeguards. It is also true because of the
high cost of diabetes: Medicare spent more than $47.6 billion in direct medical costs for
diabetes-related care in 2002.2 Indeed, the health services research literature is replete
with studies underscoring how patient cost-sharing, another seemingly modest cost
containment strategy, can impair the safety and quality of essential services, while
paradoxically elevating health care costs among vulnerable populations.3
This analysis examines the implications of Medicare’s competitive acquisition
program for Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics and Supplies (DMEPOS)
in the context of beneficiaries with diabetes who depend on routine blood glucose testing
as a basic element of their health care. Following an overview of the competitive
acquisition statute and its implementing regulations and guidelines, this policy brief then
assesses the access, quality, and safety implications of competitive acquisition. Negative
unintended consequences are especially likely to arise as a result of the introduction of
competitive purchasing arrangements that lack essential patient safeguards.

Background
The Medicare Competitive Acquisition Statute
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003
(MMA)4 amended Medicare to create a permanent competitive acquisition program for
DMEPOS. The purpose of the amendments was to bring competitive purchasing
1

Institute of Medicine, Care Without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late (National Academy Press,
Washington D.C. 2002).
2
Zhang, P, Engelgau, MM., Norris, SL, Gregg, EW, Narayan, KM. 2004. "Application of Economic
Analysis to Diabetes and Diabetes Care" Annals of Internal Medicine 140:11 972-977.
3
Brook, R. et al. 1984. The Effect of Coinsurance on the Health of Adults: Results from the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment, Rand Corporation. ISBN 0-8330-0614-2; Lurie, N., W. Manning, C. Peterson, G.
Goldberg, C. Phelps and L. Lillard. “Preventive Care: Do We Practice What We Preach?” American
Journal of Public Health 77(7): 801-804; Goldman, D., G. Joyce and Y. Zheng. 2007. “Prescription Drug
Cost Sharing.” Journal of the American Medical Association 298(1): 61-69.
4
Section 302(b) P.L. 108-173 (108th Cong. 1st Sess.).
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techniques to the acquisition of certain Medicare Part B covered items or services,
including diabetes supplies. The legislation authorized the Secretary to employ
competitive acquisition techniques in the case of “competitively priced items and
services”5 for which payment can be made under Part B. The amendments enumerated a
series of Part B items and services that qualified for competitive acquisition.6 The
legislation authorized the Secretary to exempt otherwise included items and services in
low density rural areas and non-competitive urban areas “unless there is a significant
national market through mail-order for a particular item or service,” as well as “items and
services for which the application of competitive acquisition is not likely to result in
significant savings.”7
Unlike Medicare’s outpatient prescription drug and Medicare Advantage programs –
which were the subject of extensive patient protection discussions during enactment of
the 2003 amendments – the DMEPOS competitive acquisition statute lacks basic safety,
quality, and access safeguards that have become staples of modern, market-based
competitive purchasing arrangements. These competitive acquisition amendments are
almost totally devoid of quality and safety standards; in marked contrast to Medicare Part
D prescription drug benefits and Medicare Advantage, the competitive acquisition
amendments have cost-cutting as their sole focus. This legislative focus on price
discounts – to the exclusion of other, potentially countervailing considerations – reveals
itself in numerous ways:

5



First, the legislation permits the Secretary to extend competitive acquisition to
items and services that have the “highest volume” and the “largest savings
potential.”8



Second, the only required contracting standards are first, that amounts paid to
winning entities be expected to be “less than the total amounts that would
otherwise be paid” and second, that individuals have a “choice of multiple
suppliers.”9



Third, the statutory text is completely permissive where beneficiary safeguards
and patient safety are concerned: winning contractors must meet “applicable
quality standards,”10 but in referencing “applicable” quality standards, the text of
the law gives the Secretary discretion over whether to develop any quality
standards at all.



Fourth, even where coverage design and safety are concerned, the law is
permissive with respect to whether beneficiaries must be given advance

§1847 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(a)(1)(A).
§1395w-3(a)(1)(A)(2)(A)-(C).
7
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(a)(3).
8
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(a)(1)(B)(ii).
9
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3 (b)(2)(A)(iii) and (iv).
10
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3 (b)(2)(A)(i).
6
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information regarding what services and supplies will be available to them or
what the costs will be.11


Fifth, the legislation prohibits the Secretary from delaying competitive
acquisition even if there is a “delay in implementation of quality standards…or
receipt of advice from the program advisory committee.”12



Sixth, the law gives the Secretary the discretion to require contractors to provide
exceptions to coverage limits and exclusions, even when the beneficiary’s
prescribing physician determines that “use of the particular item or service
would avoid an adverse medical outcome on the individual.”13

In sum, the competitive acquisition legislation marks a fundamental departure from
other legislative initiatives aimed at introducing market principles into Medicare. Even as
Congress was simultaneously addressing issues of information, quality, safety, and
beneficiary protections in enacting Part D, the same considerations were virtually nonexistent in the case of the competitive acquisition of Part B services and supplies. Despite
the fact that prescribed medical equipment and supplies may raise precisely the same
questions of appropriateness and quality that exist in the case of prescription drugs and
biologicals, the legislation remained silent on patient safeguards, entrusting the Secretary
with expansive power to design an appropriate program.
Under the statute, the Secretary is authorized to create a class of “competitive”
supplies and services for which the Department’s dominant policy focus becomes the
achievement of unit price savings. Safeguards essential to high volume discount
purchasing involving a frail population are not addressed, nor is the question of overall
value for Medicare. Instead, the legislation appears to empower the Secretary to take
aggressive action to get price discounts without regard to overall value or basic
beneficiary protections, even in the case of services and supplies that play a central and
direct role in beneficiary health maintenance.
In these respects, the competitive acquisition statute represents a fundamental
departure from previous Congressional efforts to inject market competition into high
volume purchasing of covered items and services that directly “touch” beneficiaries, such
as prescribed drugs and comprehensive managed care plans. Furthermore, the legislation
extends extraordinary powers to the Secretary, waiving fundamental elements of public
administration law that are designed to bring transparency and accountability to agency
conduct. As such, federal contracting laws are waived14 as are the provisions of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).15
11

42 U.S.C. §1395w-3 (b)(5)(D) sets forth a rule of construction that specifies simply that “nothing in this
section shall be construed as precluding the use of an advanced ben3eficairy notice with respect to
competitively priced items and services.” No mandatory disclosure requirements are specified.
12
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(b)(B).
13
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(a)(5).
14
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(a)(1)(C).
15
42 U.S.C. §1395w-3(c)(4).
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CMS Implementation of the Competitive Acquisition Program
CMS’ implementation of competitive acquisition rests on a single evaluation of a
national competitive bidding demonstration16 involving DMEPOS. The evaluation took
place in two sites (Polk County, Florida, and three counties in the San Antonio, Texas
metropolitan statistical area) over a three-year time period (1999-2002). In neither site
was mail-order purchasing of diabetes supplies evaluated. Many of the items and services
covered in the demonstrations were of a type that tends to be low volume and purchased
on an infrequent basis (e.g., hospital bed, wheelchairs, and orthotics). The demonstration
was short (one round of competitive bidding in San Antonio, two rounds in Polk County)
and the results showed certain quality related problems as well as a reduction in the use
of daily oxygen among beneficiaries.
The analysis compared the price of items and services purchased through
competitive acquisition to their price in an open market, but did not assess the overall
value to Medicare in terms of patient health and functional status, or the consequential
costs related to the use of inappropriate, inadequate or inferior services and supplies.
Furthermore, in the Florida site, the analysis found an actual increase in the amount of
services purchased under the demonstration in the case of oxygen, with commensurate
volume drops in surrounding counties, a suggestion that far from producing savings,
volume purchasing may distort the market for certain goods and services that are used
regularly and continuously and that must be re-supplied frequently. In the words of the
evaluation, there was some evidence of “volume responses to fee changes brought about
by competitive bidding.”17 There is no evidence that CMS has made a further effort to
understand the underlying drivers of these market distortions.
The analysis also found “global” measures of access and satisfaction, noting
“evaluation data on issues of quality and product selection suggested that quality did not
change appreciably.”18 Despite the fact that Medicare is an insurance program, whose
patient protections and safeguards are designed to operate at the individual beneficiary
level rather than in a global context, the report lacked any evaluation of individual cases
in which “global” satisfaction measures did not apply, nor did the final report recommend
patient protections. In other words, the evaluation was focused on the bulk purchasing
aspects of the demonstration and its aggregated effects on beneficiaries, not on the
experiences of individual patients with access, quality or safety. For example, only in
passing did the report indicate a “doubling” of reports of no help in securing assistance
with insurance and a “halving” of reports indicating that help was provided. Also
mentioned in passing was a doubling of complaints in the case of certain products sold in
San Antonio and a drop in patient willingness to recommend their nebulizer suppliers, a
product that involves frequent purchase and use.19 This lack of assistance may have a
16

Final Report to Congress: Evaluation of Medicare’s Competitive Bidding Demonstration for Durable
Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies (United States Department of Health and Human
Services, Tommy Thompson, Secretary) (2004).
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/CMS_rtc.pdf
17
Id. p. 6.
18
Id. p. 17.
19
Id p. 15.
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significant effect on the appropriate use of a product and inappropriate use and reduced
health outcome. Despite the potential importance of assistance in use, the effects of
withdrawing such assistance were not separately tested.
In spite of the study’s evident limitations and findings of problems with safety,
quality, and access, CMS moved ahead with the competitive acquisition program, not
only in product categories covered by the demonstrations but also with respect to mailorder diabetes supplies, which had not been the subject of the pilot. Final regulations
published in April 200720 noted that “over 60 percent of Medicare expenditures for
diabetic supplies are for items furnished by nationwide mail-order suppliers” and that a
separate mail-order program for diabetes supplies was appropriate:
“We believe that the implementation of a separate mail-order competitive
bidding program would result in significant savings because it would
focus on suppliers that can obtain discounts from manufacturers because
they furnish a large volume of items to beneficiaries through the mail.”21
The CMS decision to proceed was thus based on an aggregate estimate (no evidence
was cited) of mail-order use, without further analysis of the quality of mail-order
services, beneficiary experiences with mail-order, or the effects of mail-order purchases
on overall Medicare costs. Indeed, as recently as March 2008, CMS touted unit cost
savings achieved through competitive acquisition, without offering any accompanying
estimate of the overall cost of treatment for patients with diabetes in the competitive
bidding regions, and without any analysis of the impact of competitive acquisition on
patient care and health outcome.22
The final rules essentially parrot the statute and are virtually devoid of the types of
patient protection standards that have come to be customary in Medicare competitive
market programs. The regulations specify that suppliers must meet “applicable quality
standards developed by CMS,”23 but the regulations never state what those standards will
be or the purchasing and oversight procedures that CMS will utilize in order to assure
that services and supplies remain accessible, safe, and of appropriate quality. The
Preamble to the final rules notes simply that “it is in the best interest of the industry and
beneficiaries to select the accreditation organizations and publish . . . quality standards
through program instructions.”24 In other words, the standards against which suppliers are
to be governed are to be shaped by suppliers themselves. What, precisely, these industry
standards are, or how they would assure quality and safety or avoid potential conflicts of
interest, remains totally unexplained.

20

72 Fed. Reg. 17992-18090 (April 10).
72 Fed. Reg. 18018.
22
CMS, Medicare to Save an Average of 26% for Some Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics
and Supplies in Selected Areas; Beneficiaries to Join in Savings.
http://www.cq.com/displayfile.do?docid=2691163&productId=5 (Accessed March 21, 2008).
23
42 C.F.R. §414.414(c).
24
72 Fed. Reg. 18035.
21
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The rules specify the need for a “sufficient number of suppliers,”25 but do not
address the sufficiency of the manufacturer products (or choice of products) that actually
is available through participating suppliers. Despite concerns that CMS provided
insufficient information regarding how the agency would measure supplier capacity
within any competitive bidding area, CMS provided no additional guidance, despite the
fact that none of the regional demonstrations had involved mail-order diabetes supplies.26
Although the regulations require suppliers to adhere to physician prescriptions for
specific items or services, they set forth no formal exceptions system as in the case of
Part D and authorize suppliers to “consult with the treating physician to find an
appropriate alternative brand” or “assist the beneficiary in locating a contract supplier
that can furnish the particular brand of item or mode of delivery.”27 While these
“assistance” and “consultation” services may sound innocuous, they lack basic
safeguards such as prompt timelines or an obligation to provide a short term supply that
conforms to the prescription while “assistance” and “consultation” are pursued. The
regulations provide neither grievance nor appeals rights, allowing companies to use high
pressure tactics to induce patients to switch products or to invite non-cooperative patients
to leave their systems without any means of appealing.
In essence, the competitive acquisition program, as articulated in statute and
regulation, is virtually devoid of beneficiary protections generally, and in relation to mailorder diabetes supplies in particular. Beneficiaries who can make the system work for
themselves are free to try to do so, with an apparent assumption by CMS that no harm
will flow from its system and that unhappy participants always can return to the retail
market. The net effect of this haphazard approach to an important matter of health care
policy is to invite both patient safety problems and – paradoxically – program exposure to
excess product costs, as consumers who experience problems with mail-order suppliers
return to retail purchasing, even as inappropriate, high-volume mail-order supplies
continue to arrive at patients’ homes.
Proposed regulations promulgated in 2008 would limit the direct solicitation of
beneficiaries (i.e., cold calling).28 At the same time, however, the proposed rules contain
two major loopholes: cold calls would be permitted where the individual has given
written permission to the supplier to continue contact, or where the cold call concerns a
second item or service not previously purchased and the supplier has furnished at least
one covered item during the 15-month time period preceding the date of contact.29 The
regulation specifies no standards aimed at assuring that written permission is the result of
a specific informed consent to continue to receive subsequent calls related to product
marketing, nor is it clear why current customers should be subjected to cold calls
regarding other products that they have never purchased, may never have seen or used,
and that may be completely unrelated to their underlying condition. Furthermore, while
the proposed rule would prohibit efforts to “directly solicit” business, it contains no
25

42 C.F.R. §414.414(h).
72 Fed. Reg. 18042-18043.
27
42 C.F.R. §414.420(b).
28
73 Fed. Reg. 4513 (January 25, 2008).
29
Id.
26
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definition of what it means to “directly solicit” patient business, thereby leaving the door
open to deceptive or high pressure marketing practices of the type that have emerged in
other Medicare competitive markets. Conversely, the standard also fails to delineate what
constitutes appropriate contact within an existing health professional/patient relationship.

Implications of the Competitive Acquisition Program for Medicare
Beneficiaries with Diabetes, and for Medicare Costs
In order to assess the implications of competitive acquisition in a diabetes context it
is important to understand the nature of diabetes, its incidence and prevalence among the
Medicare population, and its consequences for beneficiary health and Medicare costs.
Medicare and Diabetes
Because of whom it affects and its toll on health, diabetes has a profound
relationship with Medicare patients and costs, as underscored by these key points:

30



The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reports that diabetes
affects nearly one-fifth of all Medicare beneficiaries and that Medicare
beneficiaries with diabetes account for nearly one third of all Medicare
expenditures.30



More than one-quarter (27%) of low-income seniors and people with disabilities
who are enrolled in both Medicaid and Medicare (also known as dual enrollees)
have diabetes.31



A recent analysis of Medicare claims data and other program data, which applied
newer criteria for diagnosing diabetes at an earlier stage, found that between
1994-1995 and 2003-2004, the annual incidence of diabetes increased by 23
percent while its prevalence increased by 62 percent. While mortality rates fell by
8.3 percent, complication rates among persons with diagnosed diabetes generally
increased or stayed the same. The study found high rates of major complications,
in particular a doubling of the risk for congestive heart failure and myocardial
infarction.32 The rate of congestive heart failure during the 1999-2004 time
periods among beneficiaries with diabetes stood at 47.5 percent. Among
beneficiaries who experienced at least 6 years of diagnosed diabetes, nearly 90
percent experienced at least one adverse outcome. Researchers noted the

CMS, Medicare Health Support to Improve Care of Beneficiaries with Chronic Illnesses. Medicare Fact
Sheet, cited in Health Policy R and D, Medicare’s New Competitive Acquisition Program for Durable
Medical Equipment: Policy Considerations Involving Beneficiaries with Diabetes, Community Based
Retail Pharmacies, and Blood Glucose Monitoring (Washington D.C., January 2006), p. 9.
31
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. “Dual Eligibles: Medicaid’s role for Low-Income Medicare
Beneficiaries.” (2006), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/Dual-Eligibles-Medicaid-s-Role-for-LowIncome-Medicare-Beneficiaries-Feb-2006.pdf (accessed March 10, 2008).
32
Frank A. Sloan et al., The Growing Burden of Diabetes Mellitus in the US Elderly Population, Archives
of Internal Medicine 168:2 192-199 (Jan. 28, 2008).

GWU SPHHS for the
Diabetes Access Coalition (June 18, 2008)

10

“overwhelming burden” of diabetes and the low rates of adherence to health care
utilization guidelines among patients,33 which if anything, would have placed
these estimates at a lower bound. The study underscores the fact that lower rates
of surrogate markers for diabetes complications does not necessarily “translate
into reduction in adverse events.”34
Figure 1 underscores the extent to which the Medicare population falls squarely
within the risk factors for diabetes and its complications. These factors include age,35
racial or ethnic minority status,36 disability and activity limitations,37 and low family
income.38 The Medicare population is disproportionately low income, in fair to poor
health, and significantly affected by activity limitations and cognitive and mental
impairments. At particular risk may be the 7.5 million dual enrollees who receive both
Medicare and Medicaid; by definition these beneficiaries are poor, and due to the link
between poverty and membership in a disadvantaged racial or ethnic group, they are
disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities. Their low income makes dual enrollees
more likely than other Medicare beneficiaries to have low health literacy, potentially
limiting the appropriate use of health care and rendering them less capable of navigating
competitive purchasing arrangements.

33

Id. p. 198.
Id.
35
Ashkenazy, Rebecca and Abrahamson, Martin. 2006. “Medicare Coverage for Patients with Diabetes: A
National Plan with Individual Consequences.” Journal of General Internal Medicine 21: 382-392.
36
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2005. “National Diabetes Fact Sheet: United States, 2005.”
37
Gregg, EW, Beckles, GLA, Williamson, DF, Leveille, SG, Langlois, JA, Engelgau, MM, Narayna, KM,
2000. “Diabetes and Physical disability Among Older U.S. Adults” Diabetes Care 23:9 1272-1277.
38
Valdmanis, V., D. Smith and M. Page. 2001. “Productivity and Economic Burden Associated with
Diabetes.” American Journal of Public Health 91(1): 129-130.
34
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Figure 1. Medicare Covers a Population with
Diverse Needs and Significant Vulnerabilities
Percent of total Medicare population:
Income <200% FPL
($20,420 in 2007)

47%
36%

3+ Chronic Conditions
30%

Fair/Poor Health
Cognitive/Mental
Impairment

29%
16%

2+ ADL Limitations

15%

Under-65 Disabled

12%

Age 85+
Long-term Care
Facility Resident

5%

Note: ADL is activity of daily living. SOURCE: Income data from 2005, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population
Survey, 2006 Annual Social and Economic Supplement. All other data are from the Kaiser Family Foundation
analysis of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 2003 Cost and Use file.

Treating diabetes begins with controlling blood glucose levels. Like other persons
with diabetes, Medicare beneficiaries depend on constant health maintenance with
treatments and therapies to avert the type of life-threatening deterioration that is heavily
associated with the condition. Self-monitoring of blood glucose levels is essential to good
diabetes control, particularly in the case of persons with diabetes who take insulin.39
Indeed, self-monitoring is considered so vital to disease management that increasing the
proportion of persons with diabetes who self-monitor represents a national public health
objective under Healthy People 2010.40 As a result, any policies that even potentially
impair access to diabetes supplies merit close scrutiny and careful implementation.
Potential Consequences of Mail-order Competitive Acquisition of Diabetes Testing
Supplies for Beneficiaries and Program Costs
No systematic evaluation was undertaken prior to launching a competitive
acquisition system for mail-order diabetes supplies. As a result, it is extremely important
to consider the possible outcomes of the CMS program. In examining the potential issues
raised by competitive acquisition of diabetes testing supplies, it quickly becomes evident
that a major paradox emerges: because the system lacks fundamental patient safeguards,
it may harm patients as it also increases program cost and waste.

39

Adams, A, Mah, C, Soumerai, SB, Zhang, F, Barton, MB, Ross-Degnan, D. 2003. “Barriers to self
monitoring of blood glucose among adults with diabetes in an HMO: A cross sectional study” BMC Health
Services Research 3:6.
40
Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2007. “Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose Among Adults with
Diabetes—United States, 1997-2006” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report5 6:43 1133-1137.

GWU SPHHS for the
Diabetes Access Coalition (June 18, 2008)

12

Potential risks flowing from the absence of patient safeguards
As noted, these federal regulations lack key patient safeguards that have come to be
customary in competitive acquisition and market-driven arrangements. The chief
implication flowing from the absence of such safeguards is reduced access to essential
services, with an attendant adverse health impact. Where diabetes is concerned, the health
implications of limiting access to health maintenance services such as appropriate testing
supplies are especially severe.
For many years, researchers at the George Washington University have studied the
design of laws and legal instruments such as procurement contracts in a consumer
protection context. Our patient protection research41 (which has been extensively
supported by federal funding over the years) has focused on competitive purchasing
arrangements, and has been recognized as a seminal contribution to the field. Indeed, our
study Negotiating the New Health System, first published in 1997, served as the research
basis for the statutory patient safeguard provisions that were added to the Medicaid
managed care statute by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
Our research has taught us over the years that although the precise nature of
competitive purchasing arrangement can vary – in addition to DMEPOS, Medicare today
permits the competitive purchase of outpatient prescribed drugs and Medicare Advantage
plans – the key elements of patient protection nonetheless remain the same. These critical
elements reflect safeguards against the excesses of competition, in recognition of the
limited ability of most patients – and in particular, patients with limited cognitive skills
and in poorer health – to navigate market complexities.
Table 1 sets forth key patient safeguard categories that have been identified by GW
researchers through our analyses over the years. Our work has underscored the fact that
these categories are pertinent, regardless of whether the competitive arrangement is
offered to beneficiaries on a mandatory (e.g., Medicaid managed care) or voluntary basis.
Table 1 shows that in virtually every safeguard category, the DMEPOS competitive
acquisition regulations fall short where patient safety is concerned, even though similar
standards are consistently present in the case of both Medicare Part D prescription drugs
and Medicare Advantage plans. Either of these program designs could have readily
served as a template for CMS in the development of DMEPOS patient safeguards.
As Table 1 shows, even a cursory examination of its five major patient protection
domains and 17 sub-domains illustrates the weaknesses of the CMS regulatory structure.
The DMEPOS regulations address – barely – precisely two sub-domains of safety and
protection. Instead, the regulations essentially parrot the competitive acquisition statute,
which as noted, is silent on patient safeguards but which empowers the Secretary to
design the system and develop patient safety standards. This key additional step did not
occur, and is not required by law or regulation to occur.

41

Rosenbaum, S. et al., Negotiating the New Health Care System: A Nationwide Study of Medicaid
Managed Care Contracts (George Washington University, Washington D.C. 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001).
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Table 1. Key Beneficiary Safeguard Lapses Under CMS DMEPOS Regulations
Patient Protection Domains
Marketing and Information
Prohibition against cold calling

Addressed/Not Addressed

Clear communication regarding benefits and limitations, low
health literacy standards

Not addressed

Minimum information content requirements regarding services
and benefits

Not addressed

Compliance with Title VI Limited English Proficiency (LEP)
guidelines and disability communication access under
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Not addressed

Program membership rights
Toll-free assistance number

Limited protections, major
exceptions, no definition of
direct solicitation

Not addressed

Clear communication requirements in accordance with low
literacy readability standards related to use of services

Not addressed

Translation compliance with Title VI guidelines for persons with
Limited English Proficiency (LEP)

Not addressed

Compliance with ADA communication access standards

Not addressed

Membership information about services, cancellation, grievance
and appeals rights
Benefit Design
A range of manufacturer items and services meeting evidencebased standards for quality and safety

Not addressed

Clear exceptions process for medically indicated need

Exception system contains
no standards, procedures or
timelines

Access and Quality
Clear standards by which suppliers will be measured in such
areas as timeliness, and product condition and suitability
Response time to oral or written requests for service
modifications
Internal and external quality measurement and performance
improvement
requirements
covering
both
technical
performance and patient experience
Grievances and Appeals
Timely and accessible grievance and appeals procedures

Not addressed

Not addressed

Not addressed

Not addressed
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Numerous potential risks flow from the absence of patient safeguards applicable to
diabetes mail-order systems (or any other competitive acquisition service or product for
that matter). Since no evidence regarding who does or does not use mail-order
accompanies the CMS mail-order estimates, it is impossible to know how mail-order
affects the experiences of certain beneficiary subgroups. A few of the issues that may
present themselves are as follows:


The lack of definitions related to direct solicitation means that patients who had
an isolated prior business dealing with a company may encounter cold calls and
pressure sales tactics.



The enrollment process may yield disproportionate enrollment among patients
with limited English or health literacy abilities, or who experience higher levels of
mental and cognitive impairments.



Because detailed quality standards are lacking in the regulations, patients may be
simultaneously inundated with supplies they do not need while being denied the
monitoring supplies they seek. To the extent that patients’ clinicians are willing to
attempt to intervene in order to help patients, the regulations fail to specify any
process for such intervention and allow the supplier to continue to furnish
inappropriate services while telling the patient to go elsewhere.



Failing to specify a grievance and appeals system allows suppliers to refuse
services to beneficiaries whose treating physicians seek customization for medical
reason. Mail-order could have the perverse effect of actually driving up costs, not
only because patients are improperly self-monitoring, but because they may stop
testing.

What Impact Might a System Without Patient Protections Have on Beneficiary
Access to Diabetes Testing Supplies?
In considering the implications of an expanded mail-order competitive acquisition
system, four distinct and major issues arise. These issues could significantly and
adversely affect beneficiary health and access to health care, even if the CMS competitive
acquisition system were to leave retail purchasing as a coverage option. These issues are
as follows:


First, problems with access and choice, both of which carry attendant health and
cost consequences, including a potential Medicaid spillover problem



Second, problems related to the quality of care and its health consequence



Third, the exacerbation of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic health disparities



Fourth – and paradoxically – Medicare cost increases for diabetes testing supplies,
despite somewhat lower unit prices, as the volume of deliveries skyrockets, with
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an attendant spike in retail purchasing as beneficiary confusion over sources of
products grows and as they attempt to compensate for inappropriate mail-order
products.

1) Mail-order systems may create access and choice problems, with potential overall cost
consequences if routine testing declines
The wide range of blood glucose monitoring systems available in the market
demonstrates the highly variable and complex nature of beneficiary needs; thus, an
exclusionary competitive acquisition program has the potential to act as a barrier to
necessary care among vulnerable beneficiaries.42
The rule provides one payment level for test strips and one payment level for
monitors under the Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS). As a result,
CMS has no means of identifying which products – by manufacturer name and model
number – are provided to beneficiaries. The implications of this incomplete coding
system is its tendency to mask a mail-order supplier’s dangerous narrowing of
beneficiary access to products, fostering wholesale product substitution even when
clinical customization may be essential. Furthermore, unless a beneficiary thinks to tell a
treating health professional that the products received were not, in fact, the product
prescribed, the health professional may have no way to appeal or protest, since the rules
do not require suppliers to inform treating clinicians that product substitution has taken
place.
There are important functional differences between different monitors: some
monitors offer audible, step-by-step directions; some monitors work well in high altitude,
temperature, or humidity; some monitors transmit data to a physician’s office; some
monitors are more adaptable to individuals with motor skill related disabilities. A
winning supplier may limit access to some products, sacrifice quality, and substitute
lower quality products. By limiting the choice of products, suppliers may leave Medicare
beneficiaries without access to their prescribed products. Dissatisfaction with lowerquality substitute products may cause patients, in turn, to monitor their blood glucose less
frequently or to stop testing, which can result in increased diabetes complications and
costs to the Medicare program.
In this way, unit price discounts achieved from suppliers might adversely affect
patients, as suppliers limit their products to the least expensive and those that yield the
most profit. At the same time, treating health professionals may have no idea that a
substitution occurred until the damage has been done, because of the absence of
safeguards.

42

Health Policy R and D. “Medicare’s New Competitive Acquisition Program for Durable Medical
Equipment: Policy Considerations Involving Beneficiaries with Diabetes, Community Based Retail
Pharmacies, and Blood Glucose Monitoring.” Washington D.C., January 2006.
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Another important issue raised by the spread of mail-order without careful
evaluation is the loss of the role of the retail pharmacist as an intermediary and educator.
As noted, diabetes supplies are different from other products that have been considered
for competitive bidding because of the lack of a ready intermediary to assist patients
through the purchasing process. Patients rely heavily on intermediaries such as
pharmacists to guide them when purchasing medical equipment and supplies. The
substitution of mail-order essentially eliminates the personal interaction that comes with
retail purchasing, leaving patients without a dependable source of expertise at the point of
service. Diabetes supplies must be purchased much more often than other types of
equipment and supplies subject to the DMEPOS system. By contrast, evidence suggests
significant instability in the high volume DMEPOS market, with extensive turnover and
difficult-to-track vendors.43
Mail-order compels navigational skills on the part of patients, who in turn may
experience trouble in gaining access to diabetes supplies that are optimal for their care.
Were competitive acquisition further devolved to the retail level, this navigational
problem would only intensify, as beneficiaries experience an erosion of outlets
possessing an appropriate choice of product.
To the extent that an expanded use of the competitive acquisition program relies on
use of Internet to communicate educational materials to beneficiaries, extensive evidence
shows that, by and large, Medicare beneficiaries do not use the Internet44 and may in fact
have age-related vision problems that create access barriers to any competitive
acquisition program that relies on Internet use.45 An internet based approach, for
example, lacks the type of hands-on assistance that comes from Certified Diabetes
Educators (CDEs), health care professionals who, when made available as part of an
overall care management plan, can help patients navigate care options including the
purchase of equipment and supplies.
The CMS program lacks certain other important safeguards. For example, the
competitive acquisition demonstrations on which the program is based do not shed light
on how people are informed of coverage changes in their market. No major campaigns
comparable to that which followed the enactment of Part D have been proposed. It is
unclear how beneficiaries would learn to navigate the market to obtain daily products;
indeed, it appears that they are simply expected to respond to aggressive marketing by
online firms or through cold calls, precisely the type of aggressive marketing approaches
that have raised concerns in other markets.
To the extent that competitive acquisition impairs access to access to health
management services such as testing, cost savings achieved through discount pricing for
43

HHS, Office of the Inspector General, Semi-Annual Report to Congress (Oct. 1, 2006 – March 31, 2007)
Available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/semiannual/2007/semiannualfirsthalf07.pdf (Accessed
April 2, 2008).
44
Kaiser Family Foundation. 2005. “Seniors and the Internet Survey.”
45
O’Hara, Karen. 2004. “’Curb Cuts’ on the Information Highway: Older Adults and the Internet.”
Technical Communications Quarterly 13(4): 423-445.
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diabetes supplies could quickly be swamped by elevated costs elsewhere in the system.
The most recent study of the economic cost of diabetes in the U.S. in 200746 shows a cost
of $174 billion in a single year, including $116 billion flowing from excess medical
expenditures alone. Because persons with diabetes have per capita medical expenditures
that are approximately 2.3 times higher than expenditures in the absence of a condition,
the emphasis must be on disease management. Efforts to reduce the immediate costs
associated with health maintenance pale next to the cost of hospital inpatient care, which
represented 50 percent of total medical expenditures attributable to diabetes in 2007.
A final cost-related problem stemming from diminished access should be noted in
the case of dual enrollees. Because of the high number of dual enrollees with diabetes,
Medicare policy changes that limit access under one payer could have a spillover effect
by increasing Medicaid exposure to (suddenly) uncovered testing supplies not available
through mail-order businesses but available for retail purchase in pharmacies. This
spillover phenomenon could in turn prompt Medicaid programs to reduce their own
coverage of diabetes testing supplies in order to shield their own budgets from this
rollover effects. Unlike Medicare Part D, nothing in the DMEPOS amendments
disentitles dual enrollees from Medicaid coverage of diabetes testing supplies under state
plans. Thus, coverage that is denied or disallowed in Medicare potentially rolls over onto
state Medicaid programs if patients buy from retail outlets that participate in Medicaid.
In sum, to the extent that mail-order purchasing drives down adherence to frequent
testing, the potential health consequences to patients – and cost consequences to
Medicare and Medicaid alike from uncontrolled diabetes – loom as key possibilities that
compel further study. The need to study the potential effects of primary care access
restrictions is particularly urgent in the case of diabetes because alternative pathways to
cost-savings exist. While the evidence is inconclusive, it appears that a viable cost
reduction strategy is aggressive primary management, including efforts to maintain blood
glucose levels as a means of maintaining health and averting complications. For example,
between 1994 and 1998, Veterans Administration facilities spent more than $214.8
million in outpatient and $1.45 billion in inpatient expenditures for patients with
diabetes.47 During this time period, disease management was strengthened, resulting in a
decrease in the number of diabetes-related hospitalizations and an increase in outpatient
visits by patients with diabetes.48
2) Reduced use of testing leads to diminished quality of care
For the reasons set forth above, access barriers carry health care quality
implications. If prescribed testing equipment and supplies are not accessible, then the
overall quality of diabetes care for Medicare beneficiaries also suffers. Conditions that
could have been managed at a relatively early stage are transformed into later stage
46

ADA, Economic Costs of Diabetes in the U.S. in 2007 diabetes Care 31:3 (March 2008) pp. 1-19.
Maciejewski, ML, Maynard, C. 2004 “Diabetes-Related Utilization and Costs for Inpatient and
Outpatient Services in the Veterans Administration” Diabetes Care 27:2: B69-B73.
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Maciejewski, ML, Maynard, C. 2004 “Diabetes-Related Utilization and Costs for Inpatient and
Outpatient Services in the Veterans Administration” Diabetes Care 27:2: B69-B73.
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complications, which are already a crisis of near-epidemic proportions among Medicare
beneficiaries.
Of particular importance is the potential risk of co-morbidities as blood glucose
level monitoring declines. These co-morbidities, particularly loss of limbs and
cardiovascular complications, are extensively documented in Appendix A. Indeed, to the
extent that introduction of competitive acquisition techniques succeeds in impairing
access to appropriate testing, the entire benefit gained from the initial Congressional
determination to cover diabetes testing and supplies becomes threatened.
3) Expanded use of competitive acquisition without key patient protections may
exacerbate racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in health and health care
Poverty is a key determinant of health and life expectancy, and the gap between rich
and poor in the U.S. is growing.49 Medicare beneficiaries are not immune to this pattern;
indeed, scores of studies have documented extensive disparities in health and health care
among beneficiaries in relation to race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic class.50 Because
health care access is deemed by experts to be critical to narrowing the life expectancy
gap,51 the introduction of potential barriers to care should be the subject of particular
scrutiny.
At first blush, the use of a voluntary mail-order system for diabetes testing supplies
would not appear to be related to the problem of health disparities. But it is essential to
understand the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic patterns associated with the mail-order
business prior to broadening its use. To the extent that the use of mail-order tends to be
disproportionately concentrated among more affluent beneficiaries, such a pattern, if not
identified and taken into account prior to widening its use, can further aggravate the
health gaps that separate low income beneficiaries, who are disproportionately members
of racial and ethnic minority groups, and whose vulnerability to diabetes is particularly
great, as illustrated in Appendix A.
Extensive use of mail-order ultimately may shrink the entire market for diabetes test
strips and monitors, including the market of supplies in retail outlets. Even assuming that
an appropriate range of products remains in a more restrictive market, the question
becomes the effects of shrinking outlets on purchasers whose residence in low income
communities already narrows their purchasing landscape, and who lack the means to
navigate this landscape as it shrinks further in the face of widening use of high volume
delivery business. A Medicare policy that has the effect of limiting access sites to blood
glucose monitoring supplies in poorer communities could significantly widen disparities
in health and health care for the very Medicare beneficiaries who are most at risk.
Diabetes already lays disproportionate claim to life and health for low income and
minority persons. To the extent that low income and minority Medicare beneficiaries, as
49
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well as those with disabilities and cognitive impairments, are more likely to purchase
health care supplies through community retail outlets such as local independent
pharmacies, chain drug stores, or grocery stores or community clinics with pharmacy
services, the health disparity implications of an ever-broadening mail-order business may
be considerable.
Mail-order exerts control over health care access by substituting high volume
purchasing from limited outlets and from a limited list of products for more consumeroriented purchasing practices involving a wider variety of products that are available at
trusted sites close to home. In other instances in which primary care access limits have
been introduced as a means of controlling costs, such practices have had measurable and
adverse effects, with particular sensitivity among low income populations.52
One diabetes-specific study found that decreasing the cost of drugs decreased total
diabetes-related costs by four percent per beneficiary, highlighting the critical importance
of access to supplies and drugs that help diabetes patients control their condition.53
Another study found that variable coinsurance rates have a large effect on compliance for
diabetes prescription drug regimens.54 Similarly, Medicaid managed care initiatives that
have sought to restrict both the supply of services and the outlets through which covered
services can be secured, have been shown to raise significant issues for low income
persons who have both elevated health care needs and heightened vulnerability to system
navigation barriers.55
Ostensibly of course, competitive acquisition techniques do not withdraw coverage
but instead attempt to effectuate more efficient coverage by employing competition
techniques to reduce the range of coverage and the outlets for services. But in real world
terms, these may be distinctions without a difference where low-income beneficiaries
with elevated health needs are concerned. If the practical effect of competitive acquisition
is to make it harder for certain populations to secure covered services, the adverse results
can be expected to be the same as the results that flow when coverage is actually limited
or reduced through the use of patient cost sharing.
As this analysis underscores, there is a glaring absence of systematic evidence
regarding how Medicare beneficiaries – especially those most at risk for disparities in
health and health care – secure health care services that can be obtained either through
community retail outlets or through mail-order. Research into the characteristics of low52
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income Medicare beneficiaries who live at home in low income communities becomes
essential in assessing the implications of extending competitive acquisition to populations
that are not already adept users of mail-order systems.
The CMS data on mail-order provide no insight into the characteristics of the
Medicare beneficiaries who engage in mail-order purchasing, either by telephone or
online. The evidence suggests that retail community outlets remain critical for diabetes
supplies; one recent study concluded that over 60 percent of all elderly persons purchase
their blood glucose test strips from a community-based retail pharmacy (no similar
information appears to be available for Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities).56
Put another way, the CMS data on mail-order reflect the total amount of supplies
purchased. But these data are not particularly helpful, since they fail to offer any insight
into the characteristics of the Medicare beneficiaries who engage in mail-order
purchasing, either by telephone or online. For this reason, the known evidence regarding
the impact of patient-centered cost containment on at-risk populations should raise red
flags about the wisdom of extending competitive acquisition techniques without careful
review, particularly in the case of populations for whom such services are essential to
their ability to engage in self care. Indeed, for these populations, the emphasis should be
on aggressive efforts to expand community access points.
4) Paradoxically, higher overall Medicare diabetes costs may result from expanded use
of mail-order systems
As noted above, if the effect of aggressive use of mail-order systems lacking patient
safeguards is to drive down rates of blood glucose self-testing, mail-order may ultimately
produce overall negative cost consequences for Medicare. The competitive purchasing
demonstrations, with their exclusive focus on driving down the unit price of testing
supplies through the use of high volume competitive acquisition techniques, do not
provide evidence of overall impact, a serious shortcoming of the research on which the
2003 legislation was based.
But the economic shortcomings of the demonstrations extend beyond their failure to
consider broader, long term consequences to the program. The demonstrations fail to
consider whether high volume purchasing at discounted unit prices may, in fact, have
precisely the opposite impact on the overall cost to Medicare of diabetes testing supplies
themselves. This result may obtain if mail-order systems cause the volume of testing
supplies to skyrocket – albeit at discounted unit prices – even as wastage mounts and
beneficiaries whose supplies do not conform to their needs return to the retail market to
compensate for inappropriate supplies.
Volume purchasing can yield a decline in unit prices. But if suppliers respond to
discounts by increasing the volume, and if that volume involves inappropriate services,
56
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then the results of volume procurements may be precisely the opposite of what was
intended: an overall cost increase as supplies of inappropriate goods and services mount
and patients search for substitutes. Exactly this type of phenomenon has been
documented in DMEPOS supplier businesses. A recent GAO study found “atypical”
increases in the volume of supplies sold to Medicare over a 12-month time period, well
beyond the amount of supplies and equipment sold “in the routine course of medical
care.”57

Conclusion and Recommendations
Two basic recommendations flow from this analysis.
First, the immediate focus should be on the development of explicit patient
protections applicable to the mail-order diabetes supplies market. The differential
treatment of the DMEPOS competitive market from other competitive markets for
Medicare items and services, especially the Part D prescription drug benefit and
Medicare Advantage, is glaring. To an extent far greater than recognized under the statute
and regulations, Part B durable medical equipment, prosthetic and orthopedic items, and
medical supplies all touch beneficiaries in very real ways. The items and services covered
by DMEPOS – in particular diabetes supplies – are purchased not by health care
professionals but by the beneficiaries themselves. Millions lack the ability, knowledge
and experience to navigate a competitive system. Essential protections are needed in the
area of marketing, enrollment and disenrollment, benefit design, quality standards, and
patient protections. The near-total absence of protections is further exacerbated by the
message sent in the legislation itself, namely, that price discounting is so important that
the Secretary should pursue competitive acquisition even in the absence of quality
standards.
Second is the need for an evaluation of mail-order diabetes supplies in the
competitive acquisition program. It would indeed be ironic if, after rushing headlong into
competitive mail-order purchasing, it turned out that the very absence of safeguards
incentivized suppliers to over-supply products, actually increasing spending but not
improving health outcomes. What is urgently needed at this point – prior to any
consideration of expansion of competitive acquisition for diabetes supplies – is a careful
evaluation of the mail-order system. Such an evaluation should consider the cost, access
and quality effects of mail-order product acquisition. Furthermore, unlike the earlier
studies, additional research should be structured to examine not only aggregate measures
of patient impact, but also the experiences of patients who face higher social and health
risks as well as patients who may have encountered either excessive and unwanted
supplies, supplier resistance to patient or clinician efforts to change their practices, or
both.
Simply put, we believe that the federal government should halt any expansion of
competitive acquisition of diabetes supplies in the absence of further research. Given the
57
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current, inadequate level of understanding regarding the effects of competitive bidding,
we believe that before competitive acquisition is extended, careful evaluation of
Medicare patient behavior, particularly behavior of vulnerable beneficiaries in navigating
competitive systems, is essential. Very little is known about how Medicare beneficiaries
experience market based health care systems. The few studies that do exist focus on
systems that possess relatively extensive patient safeguards compared to the current
situation under the DMEPOS competitive acquisition program.
Several types of information would be useful in examining the effect on disparities.
For example, what proportion of low income beneficiaries live alone or with others?
Similarly, what proportion of low-income Medicare beneficiaries living in the
community have telephone service or cognitive impairments that would affect their
ability to order supplies by phone? What proportion have access to community health and
social services supports, such as a visiting nurse or meals-on-wheels program that might
step in to monitor their supplies and ensure replacement orders? In sum, it is the 40
percent of all Medicare beneficiaries who are low income – and in particular, the 7.5
million poorest beneficiaries – whose welfare should be of primary consideration in
determining whether to expand competitive acquisition to essential primary health care
services.
The final, though no less critical, area for study is the nature of the safeguards that
would need to be in place – not only for individual beneficiaries, but also in communities
that experience high concentrations of low-income and minority populations – before
proceeding with further expansion of the competitive acquisition program in the case of
diabetes supplies. Within large demonstration market areas, which sub-geographic areas
merit particular attention to access design and to access measurement in view of high
poverty and already-depressed access to care? Do these communities possess essential
outlets (e.g., pharmacies, community health centers, other clinics, grocery stores) that
must continue to participate as outlets? What process will be used to monitor the
purchasing patterns of at risk beneficiaries living in the community to ensure that they are
not inadvertently cut off from blood glucose monitoring equipment and supplies? What
emergency bypass procedures are essential to guard against the loss of access to ready
replenishment of supplies?
In considering an expansion of the competitive acquisition program, the government
should bear the burden of demonstrating that the benefits significantly outweigh the risks,
not only for patients in the aggregate but for discrete patient sub-populations who already
experience barriers to care. This burden simply cannot be met without a commitment to
additional economic and statistical research to produce evidence regarding both the direct
and indirect effects of competitive bidding. Crucial direct effects are patient selfmonitoring and monitoring errors, with results collected by race, ethnicity,
socioeconomic status, and health status. Any further research should examine not only
potential initial cost savings, but also long term health care savings through consistent or
increased testing compliance.

